Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 92
Number 2 Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume
92, Number 2

Article 11

2013

You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Stripping Pornography from
America's Workplace
Tara R. Price

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Price, Tara R. (2013) "You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Stripping Pornography from America's Workplace,"
Florida Historical Quarterly: Vol. 92: No. 2, Article 11.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/11

Price: You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Stripping Pornography from America'

You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Stripping
Pornography from America's Workplace
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.

1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
by Tara R. Price
n Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,1 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida became the first
court in the country to hold that the presence of pornography
in the workplace-by itself-could constitute a hostile working
environment for women,2 actionable under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 3 Prior to Robinson, courts frequently concluded
that Title VII offered no protection to women who felt victimized
by the presence of "sexually-oriented pictures and sexual remarks"
in the workplace, so long as overt actions targeting particular
female employees did not also exist. 4 The opinion-written by

I

Tara R. Price received her J.D. in May 2012 from Florida State University College
of Law. She also holds a B.A. in Political Science (2001) from the University of
South Florida. She is currently serving as a judicial clerk for the Honorable Robert
L. Hinkle of the United States District for the Northern District of Florida. She
thanks her husband, Trey Price, for his love and support and gives special thanks to
the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for the opportunity to write a comment on this historically significant case.
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991 ) .
1
2
Id. at 1523; Tamar Lewin, Nude Pictures are Rul,ed Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1991 , atA14.
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
4
Robinson, 760 F. Supp at 1525.
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Judge Howell W. Melton, Sr. 5-was quickly lauded 6 and criticized.7
This Comment considers the groundbreaking aspects of Judge
Melton's opinion in Robinson and analyzes how Congress and the
courts have responded in the twenty-one years that have elapsed
since the decision.
"Hey, Pussycat:" Robinson's Story

Lois Robinson was one of only a few female skilled craftworkers
employed by Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. USI) .8 JSI was known
as "a boys club" and "more or less a man's world,"9 and it never
employed a woman in a leadership role. 10 In this male-dominated
environment, pictures of nude and partially nude women were
posted throughout the workplace in several forms, including:
photographs ripped from magazines, plaques on the wall, and
advertising tool supply calendars. I I These pictures typically featured

5

6

7

8

9
10

11

The Honorable Howell W. Melton, Sr., was nominated to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida by President Jimmy Carter
on March 29, 1977, and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on April 25, 1977.
Judge Melton assumed senior status on February 1, 1991. History of the
Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CE TER, http: //www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nG
etlnfo?jid=l 617&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl&highlight=null (last accessed
July 6, 2012).
·
See, e.g., Amy Horton, Comment, Of Superoision, Centerfolds, and Censorship:
Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 403, 406 & n.17 (1991) (citing news articles and stating that
Robinson "was immediately hailed in the national news media as a milestone
for women's rights" and "a ground-breaking decision for women in maledominated trades") .
See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST. LJ. 481 , 540 (1991) (criticizing the court
for "not tak[ing] the [F]irst [A]mendment issue seriously"); Paul B. Johnson,
The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 619, 624 (1993) ("[T]hejudge abandoned his role as trier of
fact on the most critical issue in the case and turned it over to social experts ..
. . [T] he judicial overkill that took place in Judge Melton 's courtroom cannot
be justified.").
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491. Robinson began working for JSI in 1977 as a
third-class welder and was promoted to a second- and first-class welder by 1991.
Id.
Id. at 1493.
Id. (stating that no woman ever worked as a leaderman, quarterman, assistant
foreman , foreman , superintendent, coordinator, vice-president, or president
of the company).
Id.
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"women in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or
submissive poses." 12
The pornography posted by JSI employees was "a visual assault
on the sensibilities offemale workers ... that did not relent during
working hours." 13 The pictures depicted women with their breasts,
buttocks, and pubic areas exposed. 14 One of the pictures depicted
two nude women "engaged in lesbian sex." 15 Male JSI employees
also wrote sexually suggestive graffiti and drew pictures of nude
women on the walls. 16 One of the drawings was "a frontal view of a
nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it." 17
Phrases scribbled on the walls included: "'lick me you whore dog
bitch,' 'eat me,' and 'pussy. "' 18
JSI employees also routinely made comments of a sexual nature
while Robinson was in the presence of the pornography, including
"Hey pussycat, come here and give me a whiff," "The more you
lick it, the harder it gets," "Black women taste like sardines," and
"I'd like to have some of that." 19 After Robinson complained to
her supervisors about the pictures and comments, her complaints
became the subject ofridicule. 20 Some of her coworkers nicknamed
her "boola-boola," an apparent "reference to sodomous rape," and
even yelled it at her in a parking lot. 21
Robinson's supervisors made her feel embarrassed over
her complaints. 22 Even her female coworkers asked her to stop
complaining because the male coworkers had begun to bring

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20

21
22

Id. Conversely, JSI employees stated that they would not have tolerated the
distribution of calendars with pictures of nude or partially nude men, as such
items would "probably [be] throw[n] ... in the trash." Id.
Id. at 1495. The pictures were so pervasive that Robinson was unable to recount
every one. Id.
Id. at 1495-96 (providing a plethora of examples, including one "picture of a
woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it") .
Id. at 1496.
Id. at 1495.
Id.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1498; see also id. at 1500 (providing examples of sexually harassing
comments heard by one of Robinson 's few female coworkers, including that a
female worker would "go to hell for culling pussy" or that a measurement was
"a cunt hair off').
Id. at 1498-99. Many ofJSI's employees felt that their behavior fell outside the
definition of sexual harassment because they felt that such harassment was
limited to propositioning a woman for sexual favors. E.g., id. at 1498.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1513.
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"hard pornography" into the JSI office to show female workers. 23
After Robinson made a formal complaint inJanuary 1985, she was
told that the "nudity on television was as bad as the pictures at JSI,
and [that] she should Uust] look the other way" 24 She was also
informed that it was her choice to work atJSI and that "the men
had 'constitutional rights' to post the pictures." 25 Robinson then
filed a complaint with the local Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission(EEOC), which performed only a "cursory"
investigation before determining that "being subject to sexually
explicit pornography" was not a cause for discrimination. 26 The
EEOC's rejection gave Robinson the right to sue in federal court.
Robinson filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, focusing her claim on her male
coworkers' demeaning comments about women and JSI's tolerance
and refusal to remove the nude and partially nude pictures. 27 She
sought damages for her losses and injunctive relief requiring JSI
to adopt and enforce an expansive sexual harassment policy. 28
Judge Melton held that Robinson had an actionable claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 because the presence
of pornography alone could constitute a sexual harassment claim
based on a hostile work environment. 30
The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Claims

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to outlaw a variety
of discriminatory practices. 31 Title VII, as it was amended in 1972,
23
24

25

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1515. Additionally, one supervisor made it expressly clear that "the
shipyards were a man 's world and that the rules against vulgar and abusive
language did not apply to the 'cussing' commonly heard" atJSI. Id. A union
representative told Robinson that she "was spending too much time attending
to the pictures and not enough time attending to her job." Id. at 1516. Union
leadership forcibly withdrew a union grievance Robinson filed about the
pictures . at 1516-17.
Id. at 1515. In a subsequent meeting, the Vice-President of one of JSI's
shipyards told Robinson that none of the posted pictures were pornographic
because only pictures "depicting intercourse, masturbation, or other sexual
activity" fell within that definition. Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1517.
Id. at 1490.
Id. at 1519.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
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prohibited employment discrimination "against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. "32 Title VII also prohibited the "limit[ation],
segregat[ion] , or classification of a person's] employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect [the individual's] status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 33
Title VII did not explicitly state that sexual harassment on the basis
of sex was considered discrimination; however, the EEOC-which
is responsible for enforcing federal laws against discrimination 34had issued guidelines recognizing that sexual harassment claims
were prohibited forms of discrimination under Title VII. 35
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the United States Supreme
Court first recognized that sexual harassment that created a hostile
working environment was an actionable claim under Title VII. 36
Mechelle Vinson filed a sexual harassment suit against her employer
and supervisor, alleging that her supervisor's demands for sexual
favors created a hostile environment. 37 Vinson's supervisor denied
that he ever made sexually suggestive remarks or had a sexual
relationship with her. 38 The district court denied Vinson relief, stating
that any sexual relationship "was a voluntary one having nothing
to do with her continued employment ... or her advancement or
promotions. "39 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's holding, finding that
Congress intended two avenues of relief under Title VII: 1) loss of
employment due to refusal of unwelcome sexual advances; and 2)
relief from a pervasive sexual harassment at work. 40
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39

40

Id. at§ 2000e-2(a) (1).
Id. at§ 2000e-2 (a) (2).
For more information about the EEOC, see About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU ITY COMMISSION, http: //www.eeoc.gov/ eeoc/ index.
cfrn (last visited March 30, 2012) .
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1985)).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980) , rev'd
fry 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded by Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Vinson, 753 F.2d at 144-145.
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After the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, the bank
asserted that under Title VII, Congress was only concerned
with prohibiting discrimination that resulted in an economic
loss and not "purely psychological aspects of the workplace
environment." 41 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the
majority and rejecting the bank's argument, 42 found that there was
not much legislative history to guide the Court's interpretation of
discrimination-based on sex-under Title VII. 43 However, the
Court reasoned that Title VII was intended "'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women. "' 44 The court
also recognized that EEOC guidelines-while not "controlling
upon the courts"-also considered sexual harassment resulting
in noneconomic injury a violation under Title VII. 45 Noting that
several courts had recognized Title VII claims where discriminatory
practices resulted in a hostile environment, 46 the Court held that
a plaintiff would have an actionable claim if the sexual harassment
was so "severe or pervasive" as to "create[] a hostile or abusive work
environment." 47 So long as the plaintiff could demonstrate that the
41
42
43

44
45

46
47

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 64 (noting that the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex
"was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives").
Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
Id. at 65. The EEOC guidelines stated that sexual conduct would be considered
prohibited sexual harassment under Title VII where "such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interferring with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (3) (1985) ).
Id. (citing cases involving actionable claims of harassment based on race,
religion, and national origin).
Id. at 66-67. The Court also cited with approval an Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion stating the same. Id. (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982)). The Henson Court stated that-based on EEOC guidelines
and legal precedent-the five elements necessary for proving a claim of sexual
harassment that creates a hostile work environment were:
The employee belongs to a protected group ....
The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment....
The harassment complained of was based upon sex ....
The harassment complained of affected a term, condition or
privilege of employment. ... [and]
(5) Respondeat Superior. Where ... the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-905 (citing cases and EEOC guidelines).
(1)
(2)
(3)
( 4)
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actions "alter[ed] the conditions of[] employment," the employee
did not need to show economic loss. 48
Only a few months after Meritor, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company4 9 whether
sexual comments by a coworker and nude or partially nude pictures
of women in the workplace were sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to create a hostile workplace. 50 Vivienne Rabidue had
filed a complaint alleging sexual discrimination and harassment
under Title VII after she was terminated from her employment. 51
Her complaint centered on the comments of a male supervisor and
the actions of male coworkers. 52 The supervisor was "a crude and
vulgar man," who often made obscene comments about women and
used "words like 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits.'" 53 Other male employees
routinely posted pictures of nude or partially nude women in
their offices or around the common areas. 54 The district court
determined that these actions did not constitute an actionable
claim under Title VII, finding that while they may have been "a
problem, [they were] not so pervasive a problem as to substantially
interfere with [Rabidue 's] employment." 55
The Sixth Circuit agreed, stating that sexually hostile
environments were characterized by the frequent occurrence of
harassing incidents and conduct. 56 While the court found the
supervisor's comments "annoying," it concluded that they were
"not so startling to have affected seriously the psyches of [Rabidue]
or other female employees." 57 The court concluded that the
48

49
50
51
52
53

54
55
56
57

Meritor, 4 77 U.S. at 67 (quoting H enson, 682 F.2d at 904). ChiefJustice Rehnquist
wrote that '"a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets."' Id. (quoting
Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 615.
Id. The supervisor led another section of the company and did not exercise
authority over Rabidue. Id.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd
by 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17 ( 1993). The supervisor also called Rabidue a "fat ass" on at least one
occasion Id.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
Id. at 622.
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pictures of nude women had only "a de minimis effect" on female
employees when society at large "condones and publicly features
and commercially exploits ... pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on
prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places. "58
The court discounted other cases where harassment was found
to have created sexually hostile workplaces as involving "more
compelling circumstances" than Rabidue presented and noted
that the instant case could not be a violation because it "involved
no sexual propositions, offensive touchings, or sexual conduct of
a similar nature." 59 Further, the Sixth Circuit found that Title VII
served a very limited purpose:
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines
may abound [in some work environments]. Title VII was
not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgotten
that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle
for equal employment opportunity for the female workers
of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII
was designed to bring about a magical transformation in
the social mores of American workers. 60
Judge Keith, however, dissented and criticized the majority
for its failure to see Rabidue's workplace as "an anti-female
environment." 61 The dissent wrote- that in using the standard
of the reasonable person-the majority failed to recognize the
"wide divergence" between women's and men's perspectives on
appropriate sexual conduct. 62 Rather, the proper standard was
that of the reasonable victim, in this case, the "outlook of the
reasonable woman." 63 Finally, Judge Keith strongly disagreed that
because society condoned similar behavior, nude pictures and
58
59
60
61

62
63

Id.
Id. at 622 n.7 (citing cases).
Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430).
Id. at 623 (Keith,]., dissenting).Judge Keith alluded to several harassing and
discriminatory incidents not detailed within the majority opinion, including
the male supervisor's comment about Rabidue: "All that bitch needs is a good
lay." Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
Id. (emphasis added). The dissent also criticized the majority for suggesting
that women assumed the risk of working in sexually hostile environments
through their voluntary choice to accept employment. Id. "[NJ o woman
should be subjected to an environment where her sexual dignity and
reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally, or physically assaulted as a matter
of prevailing male perogative." Id. at 626-27.
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sexual comments in the workplace had only a minimal effect
on women workers. 64 Noting that society also condoned slavery,
the dissent rejected that society's opinion of the conduct was the
controlling analysis. 65

Judge Melton's Groundbreaking Holding
By sharply diverging and criticizing the standards established
in Rabidue, the Middle District in the instant case became the first
court in the country to hold that nude pictures in the workplacealone-could constitute an actionable sexual harassment claim
under Title VII. 66 Following the lead of Meritor and Henson v. City
of Dundee, 67 Judge Melton analyzed the five elements necessary to
prove a discrimination claim of sexual harassment that creates
a hostile work environment. 68 Judge Melton quickly concluded
that, under the first element, Robinson belonged to a protected
category. 69 Additionally, under the second element, the evidence
was clear that Robinson did not welcome, and in fact took offense,
to the complained of conduct. 70 In considering the third elementwhether Robinson could show that she was harassed because of
her gender-Judge Melton held that behavior could, but did
not have to include sexually explicit conduct or demonstrate an
animus toward one gender. 71 Instead, the Court held that behavior
would also be considered harassment based upon sex where it
demonstrated that it was "disproportionately more offensive or
demeaning to one sex," even ifthe intent of the behavior was not to

64
65

66
67
68

69
70
71

Id. at 627.
Id. Judge Keith stated that "I hardly believe reasonable women condone the
pervasive degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in
American culture." Id.
Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-1532 ("(l) [The P]laintiffbelongs to a protected
category; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex; ( 4) the harassment complained
of affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) respondeat
superior, that is, defendants knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt, effective remedial action." (citing cases)); see also
supra note 47 (detailing the five elements).
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23.
Id.
Id. at 1522.
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offend persons of that gender. 72 Under this standard, the pictures
of nude or partially nude women-by themselves-sufficiently
constituted harassment based upon sex. 73
Under the fourth element-the impact of the harassment on
Robinson and the work environment-Judge Melton concluded
that the working environment should be evaluated under a totality
of the circumstances test, requiring subjective and objective
elements. 74 Under the subjective analysis, Robinson would have to
show that she was as or more affected than a "reasonable person
under like circumstances"; under the objective analysis, Judge
Melton adopted the "reasonable woman" standard articulated by
Judge Keith's Rabidue dissent. 75 Criticizing Rabidue for minimizing
the impact of pornographic pictures by inappropriately considering
"social context," Judge Melton stated that the Sixth Circuit
overestimated society's opinions on pornography and failed to
understand that women may be more threatened by pornography
in the workplace than in society at large. 76 Further, Judge Melton
held that Title VII was enacted to reduce hostility and ensure that
women would be treated fairly in the workplace. 77 Judge Melton
concluded that Title VII would become a meaningless promise if
it failed to protect women who were not willing to accept abuse in
historically sexually hostile workplaces. 78
Finally, under the fifth element of liability, Judge Melton
refused to allow JSI to employ an "ostrich defense" that it had no
knowledge ofRobinson's and other female employees' complaints. 79

72

73
74
75
76

77
78

79

Id. at 1522-23. The Court found a variety of harassing behaviors in the instant
case demonstrating sexually explict conduct, showing an animus toward
women, and presenting a disproportionately offensive and demeaning impact
on women. Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
Id. The evidence was clear that Robinson was as, or more, affected than a
reasonable person under the same circumstances. Id.
Id. at 1526 (citing Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1212 .118 (1989)). When a woman
is not at work, she has the option of protesting or avoiding pornography. Id.
Inside the office, the posted pictures are the unavoidable daily speech of her
supervisor or coworkers. Id.
Id.
Id. The Court held that to implement Title VII protections properly, courts
must take into account "women 's sensitivity to behavior once condoned as
acceptable." Id.
Id. at 1529-30.
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Personal participation in sexual harassment was not required if the
employer failed or refused to act when its employees complained of
inappropriate behavior. 80 Despite Robinson's meeting all five of the
required elements, Judge Melton was only able to award her nominal
damages-one dollar-because Robinson's estimated losses were
not sufficiently precise under the requirements of Title VII. 81
The Court did, however, provide Robinson with injunctive
relief, mandating that JSI adopt and enforce a comprehensive
sexual harassment policy. 82 Judge Melton also engaged in a detailed
analysis of the First Amendment's free speech requirements and
held that, despite the objections of the defendants, the First
Amendment did not bar the Court from issuing the injunction. 83
Importantly, Judge Melton found no less than six reasons why
the First Amendment did not protect defendants' desires to post
pornographic pictures in the workplace. 84
Robinson Changes the Future of Sexual Harassment Law

The publicity of Robinson, along with her economic recovery
of only one dollar, helped lead to Congress's enhancement of
the remedy provisions of actions under Title VII. 85 Robinson
illustrated that economic damages were only available to replace
actual financial loss, and only if the plaintiff had well-documented

80

81
82
83
84

85

Id. at 1528. The Court found that JSI did not adequately respond to the
complaints of sexual harassment that it received and in fact handled complaints
in such a way as to discourage future reporting. Id. at 1530-31.
Id. at 1519-21 , 1532-33.
Id. at 1534; see also id. at 1538-39 (detailingJSI's requirements).
Id. at 1534-1538.
The six reasons are that: 1) JSI disavowed that it sought to express itself
through the pictures; 2) the pictures acted as discriminatory conduct, and
thus, could not be considered protected speech; 3) regulating discriminatory
speech at work is simply a time, place, manner regulation; 4) female employees
at JSI were a captive audience; 5) even if the speech was fully protected, the
government was allowed to regulate the speech because it had a compelling
interest in ensuring female workplace equality and the regulation was narrowly
tailored to this interest; and 6) analogizing public employee speech cases, the
Court could require a private employer to restrict speech in the workplace to
remedy a demonstrated harm on other employees. Id.
Kristen H. Berger Parker, Comment, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII:
Reconsidering the Workplace Environment, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 945, 954-55
(2008) (stating that the "paucity of available remedies" under Title VII made
vindication of rights "an empty quest").
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records; there was no provis10n for compensatory or pumt1ve
damages as a result of the emotional harm many plaintiffs had
suffered. 86 Due to the stress surrounding her harassment, Robinson
sent a letter to Congress instead of providing testimony in person
about the inadequacy of the remedies available under Title VII. 87
She listed many of the terrible abuses she had suffered, and stated
that she "recovered nothing to compensate [her] for the misery"
she suffered and that the "whole experience ha[d] taken years out
of [her] life." 88 Robinson's injuries demonstrated the necessity
of reform, and in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to authorize
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for unlawful
intentional discrimination, including sexual harassment claims
based on a hostile work environment. 89
In the more than two decades since Robinson, courts have
continued to support the principle that egregious conduct, like
that of JSI's management and coworkers, can be an actionable
claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. 90
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 91 reiterated that
requiring employees to work in a discriminatory or hostile work
environment was a violation ofTitle VII. 92 As opposed to the posting
of pornography in Robinson, Harris involved repeated sexually

86

87

88

89

90
91
92

Id. at 954 (citing cases). "[S]exually harassed women" who suffered great harm
were "rarely compensated for the actual nature and extent of the harms that
they suffer[ed]." Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond
Damages Control, 3 YALEj.L. & FEMI ISM 299, 300 (1991) (stating that women
suffered from a number of injuries, including "stress; high blood pressure;
nausea; insomnia; weight Joss; anorexia; and damage to self-esteem, personal
relationships, and reputation").
Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Before the H. Comm. On
Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 590 (1991) (written statement of Lois
Robinson) , reprinted in 1 THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1991: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 102-166 77 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. & Fay Couture, eds.
1994).
Id. at 81. Robinson also stated that her award of one dollar was "a slap in the
face." Id. at 82. She doubted the effectiveness of the Court's injunction because
the order was released on a Friday, and she saw more pornographic pictures
at work the following Monday. Id. (suggesting that without a financial penalty,
"the company simply does not have much incentive to change").
See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a) (1) (2012) (providing that a plaintiff may recover
compensatory and punitive damages in addition to any damages based on
actual financial loss proven with well-documented records).
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, Employment Discrimination Law: Visions of Equality in
Theory and Doctrine 137 (3d ed. 2010).
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 21.
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harassing comments, 93 but the principle remains the same: conduct
that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"
is forbidden. 94 Further, the Harris Court stated that a victim is not
required to show that the harassment caused psychological harm
because "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown. "95
The Harris Court, however, did appear to reject indirectly
Robinson's "reasonable woman" standard. The district court had
analyzed Harris's claims from the viewpoint of a "reasonable
woman," but the Supreme Court twice stated that the standard was
how a "reasonable person" would view the work environment. 96
More recently, in Oncal,e v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 97 a case
involving male-on-male sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
again used the "reasonable person" standard. 98 The Oncal,e Court
did elaborate, however, that the standard was that of a "reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position," meaning that courts needed to
give "careful consideration of the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." 99 Under this
standard, the Oncal,e Court rejected-like the Robinson Court-the
idea from Rabidue that sexually lewd material in the workplace could
not be offensive or lead to a hostile work environment because
society condoned it on television and in certain magazines.
Following Robinson, a number of scholars alleged that Title VII's
prohibitions on a hostile work environment conflicted with the First
Amendment's free speech protections. 100 These scholars assert that
93

Id. at 19 (providing examples, including the company's president asking
female employees to get coins from his front pocket and telling Harris to "go
to the Holiday Inn" with a supervisor to renegotiate her salary).
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 21-22. Both Justices Scalia and Ginsberg also concluded that
"reasonable person" was the best standard available by which to analyze the
conduct. See id. at24 (Scalia,]., concurring); id. at25 (Ginsberg,]., concurring).
97 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
98 Id. at 81.
99 Id. (stating that a football coach smacking a player on the butt after a good
play would likely not be considered as abusive where smacking his secretary
("male or female") on the behind in his office would reasonably be perceived
as abusive or hostile).
100 Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment, Sexual
Harassment, and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGE RS L. REv.
461 (1995) (discussing two prominentscholars'-Eugene Volokh and Kingsley
Browne-arguments in detail).
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Title VII violates the First Amendment because it makes certain
types of speech illegal based on the speech's content and message. 101
_The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue but has
appeared to disregard these assertions. In RA. V v. City of St. Paul, 102
the Court used Title VII as an example of permissible regulation
that did not violate the FirstAmendment. 103 One year later in Harris,
the Supreme Court ignored any potential conflict between Title VII
and the First Amendment, despite the fact that both parties and two
amici had briefed the issue. 104 Like Robinson, a number of courts have
concluded that Title VII prohibitions of a hostile work environment
do not run afoul of the First Amendment where the government
is merely regulating conduct, not the speech itself. 105 Other courts
appear to remain unsatisfied with this analysis. 106
Robinson was a crucial step toward implementing Title VII's
intended promise to safeguard the workplace from harassment
based on sex. Robinson was groundbreaking for several reasons:
it held that pornography alone could sufficiently create a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII, that society's condoning
the behavior on television and in other commercial media was not
the appropriate standard to use to evaluate the behavior, and that

101 Id. at 463-64. For additional information, see Kingsley R. Browne, Titl,e VII as
Censorship: Hostil,e Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST.
LJ. 481 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992).
102 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
103 Id. at 389-90 (stating that "sexually derogatory 'figh ting words"' may be subject
to regulation because when the government does not regulate conduct on
the basis of "expressive content," the fact that the conduct also expresses a
"discriminatory idea" will not shield the conduct from regulation); cf. id. at
409-10 (White, J., concurring) (using Title Vll protections as an example of
laws that should not, but might run afoul of the First Amendment under the
majority's ruling).
104 Sangree, supra note 100, at 504 n.188. The Supreme Court has subsequently
recognized that it provided Title VII "as an example of a permissible contentneutral regulation of conduct" in R.A. V. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
487 (1993).
105 See, e.g., Booth v. Pasco Cnty, No. 8:09-cv-2621-T-30TBM, 2012 WL 555854,
at *7-9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (citing cases and holding that threatening
speech in the workplace that violates Title VII did not run afoul of the First
Amendment).
106 See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 n.7
(5th Cir. 1995) (calling the Supreme Court's rulings "unilluminating" and as
sidestepping the First Amendment issue due to a lack of sufficient evidence,
even though the Fifth Circuit felt applying Title VII would have resulted in the
regulation of speech because of content).
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employees could not post pictures of nude women at work by using
the First Amendment as a shield and a sword to continue sexually
harassing behavior. Looking back with today's perspective, it is
hard to imagine that-only twenty-two years ago-these behaviors
were tolerated, and in some instances entrenched, in America's
workplaces. A more definitive ruling from the Supreme Court
on the constitutionality of legislation banning sexual harassment
remains necessary, but in the two decades since Robinson, the law
has continued to evolve to protect both men and women from
employment discrimination based on sex that creates hostile
workplaces.
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